The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective dead...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Bannikova, Marina, Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:España
Institución:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:308411
Acceso en línea:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/308411
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3390/g13060077
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Sequential voting
Fixed ordering
Alternate ordering
Subgame perfect equilibrium
id ES_0c29bbec968fbccb1d79c6836ba2e72a
oai_identifier_str oai:ddd.uab.cat:308411
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order votingBannikova, MarinaGiménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623Sequential votingFixed orderingAlternate orderingSubgame perfect equilibriumThis paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline-a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins. 22022-01-0120222022-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501VoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/308411https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3390/g13060077reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengAgencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 PID2020-119152GB-I00Agencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2016-75410-PAgencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2017-86481-Popen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:3084112026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
title The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
spellingShingle The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
Bannikova, Marina
Sequential voting
Fixed ordering
Alternate ordering
Subgame perfect equilibrium
title_short The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
title_full The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
title_fullStr The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
title_full_unstemmed The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
title_sort The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bannikova, Marina
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
author Bannikova, Marina
author_facet Bannikova, Marina
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
author_role author
author2 Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Sequential voting
Fixed ordering
Alternate ordering
Subgame perfect equilibrium
topic Sequential voting
Fixed ordering
Alternate ordering
Subgame perfect equilibrium
description This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline-a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2022-01-01
2022
2022-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
VoR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://ddd.uab.cat/record/308411
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3390/g13060077
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/308411
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3390/g13060077
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Agencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 PID2020-119152GB-I00
Agencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2016-75410-P
Agencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2017-86481-P
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname_str Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
collection Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869403268706205696
score 15,811543

Similares en LA Referencia