Subgame perfection and the rule of k-names
In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the comm...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC) |
| Repositorio: | Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:minerva.usc.gal:10347/38561 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38561 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Rule of k names Screening rule Subgame perfect equilibrium Strong equilibrium Delegation |
| Sumario: | In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is -majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker. |
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