The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective dead...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:308411 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/308411 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3390/g13060077 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Sequential voting Fixed ordering Alternate ordering Subgame perfect equilibrium |
| Sumario: | This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline-a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins. |
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