On exiting after voting
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find...
| Autores: | , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2006 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:142832 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142832 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Voting Exit Subgame Perfect Equilibrium |
| Sumario: | We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative. For the case of monotonic preferences we propose, for each chosen alternative, an unambiguous and meaningful prediction of the subset of members that will exit. |
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