Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over all...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2008 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:143795 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143795 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Béns públics Public goods Gregarious preferences Subgame perfect implementation |
| Sumario: | We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. |
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