The Connection Principle and the classificatory scheme of reality
Searle's Connection Principle states that "the ascription of an unconscious intentional phenomenon to a system implies that the phenomenon is in principle accessible to consciousness". In this paper I will defend the thesis that Searle's theory of mind, and especially the Connect...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1999 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/106073 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/106073 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 130.11 159.9.016.1 Unconscious mental states Brain states Consciousness Cognitive science Aspectual shape Mental causation Humanidades Filosofía Filosofía de la mente Psicología cognitiva 72 Filosofía 7202.03 Problema Alma-Cuerpo 7203.03 Metafísica, Ontología 7206.02 Filosofía de la Materia |
| Sumario: | Searle's Connection Principle states that "the ascription of an unconscious intentional phenomenon to a system implies that the phenomenon is in principle accessible to consciousness". In this paper I will defend the thesis that Searle's theory of mind, and especially the Connection Principle, does not not offer a coherent picture of unconscious mental states and, a fortiori, of the intentional life of consciousness generally. |
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