An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets

On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric charact...

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Autores: Llerena Garrés, Francesc, Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva), Rafels, Carles
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/106690
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
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spelling An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment marketsLlerena Garrés, FrancescNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)Rafels, CarlesTeoria de jocsTeoria de conjuntsLògica matemàticaPresa de decisionsGame theorySet theoryMathematical logicDecision makingOn the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)Springer Verlag2017201720152017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion15 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-zInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, num. 1, p. 1-15https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z(c) Springer Verlag, 2015info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1066902026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
title An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
spellingShingle An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
title_short An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
title_full An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
title_fullStr An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
title_full_unstemmed An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
title_sort An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
author Llerena Garrés, Francesc
author_facet Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
author_role author
author2 Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
topic Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
description On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015
2017
2017
2017
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z
International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, num. 1, p. 1-15
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Springer Verlag, 2015
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Springer Verlag, 2015
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 15 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.811543

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