Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points

We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the ext...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier, Rafels, Carles, Ybern, Neus
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Recursos:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/154537
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154537
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
Descrição
Resumo:We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.