Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points
We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the ext...
| Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2020 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/154537 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154537 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Teoria de jocs Teoria de conjunts Lògica matemàtica Presa de decisions Game theory Set theory Mathematical logic Decision making |
| Summary: | We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained. |
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