An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric charact...
| Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2015 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/106690 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Teoria de jocs Teoria de conjunts Lògica matemàtica Presa de decisions Game theory Set theory Mathematical logic Decision making |
| Summary: | On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979) |
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