Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement

A principal wants to procure multiple homogeneous units from finitely many agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We study which mechanisms are strategy-proof and robust to collusion, both when th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Hagen, Martin
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:CUNEF Universidad
Repositorio:OpenCUNEF
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/39
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/39
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:mechanism design
procurement
collusion
group strategyproofness
reallocation-proofness
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spelling Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurementHagen, Martinmechanism designprocurementcollusiongroup strategyproofnessreallocation-proofnessA principal wants to procure multiple homogeneous units from finitely many agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We study which mechanisms are strategy-proof and robust to collusion, both when the agents can exchange money and physical units (reallocation-proofness) and when they cannot (group strategy-proofness). To achieve reallocation-proofness, the principal must offer the agents a fixed price per unit. While group-strategy-proof mechanisms can be more complex, they are inefficient and run the risk of procuring no units at all. We characterize the set of group-strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms with a uniform price. A standout feature is that the number of potential prices is bounded above by the number of agents.20232023-03-0120232023-03-01journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501AMhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/39reponame:OpenCUNEFinstname:CUNEF UniversidadInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/392026-06-17T11:50:27Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
title Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
spellingShingle Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
Hagen, Martin
mechanism design
procurement
collusion
group strategyproofness
reallocation-proofness
title_short Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
title_full Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
title_fullStr Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
title_full_unstemmed Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
title_sort Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hagen, Martin
author Hagen, Martin
author_facet Hagen, Martin
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv mechanism design
procurement
collusion
group strategyproofness
reallocation-proofness
topic mechanism design
procurement
collusion
group strategyproofness
reallocation-proofness
description A principal wants to procure multiple homogeneous units from finitely many agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We study which mechanisms are strategy-proof and robust to collusion, both when the agents can exchange money and physical units (reallocation-proofness) and when they cannot (group strategy-proofness). To achieve reallocation-proofness, the principal must offer the agents a fixed price per unit. While group-strategy-proof mechanisms can be more complex, they are inefficient and run the risk of procuring no units at all. We characterize the set of group-strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms with a uniform price. A standout feature is that the number of potential prices is bounded above by the number of agents.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2023-03-01
2023
2023-03-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
AM
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/39
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/39
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:OpenCUNEF
instname:CUNEF Universidad
instname_str CUNEF Universidad
reponame_str OpenCUNEF
collection OpenCUNEF
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.812455

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