Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
A principal wants to procure multiple homogeneous units from finitely many agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We study which mechanisms are strategy-proof and robust to collusion, both when th...
| Autor: | |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | CUNEF Universidad |
| Repositorio: | OpenCUNEF |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/39 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/39 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | mechanism design procurement collusion group strategyproofness reallocation-proofness |
| Resumo: | A principal wants to procure multiple homogeneous units from finitely many agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We study which mechanisms are strategy-proof and robust to collusion, both when the agents can exchange money and physical units (reallocation-proofness) and when they cannot (group strategy-proofness). To achieve reallocation-proofness, the principal must offer the agents a fixed price per unit. While group-strategy-proof mechanisms can be more complex, they are inefficient and run the risk of procuring no units at all. We characterize the set of group-strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms with a uniform price. A standout feature is that the number of potential prices is bounded above by the number of agents. |
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