Detecting collusion on highway procurement
This paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement. The main objective is twofold. First, to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach, and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway constructio...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Recursos: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/7424 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/7424 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | AUCTIONS CARTEL STRUCTURAL APPROACH COLLUSION COMPETITION SUBASTAS ENFOQUE ESTRUCTURAL COLUSION COMPETENCIA https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
| Resumo: | This paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement. The main objective is twofold. First, to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach, and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in California. I identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members. Relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric, I find evidence supporting the collusive scheme, for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion. |
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