Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual ration...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CUNEF Universidad |
| Repositorio: | OpenCUNEF |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/36 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/36 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | mechanism design bilateral trade multidimensional private information posted prices dominant strategies collusion-proofness |
| Sumario: | A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness. |
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