Review of Gate-Level Hardware Countermeasure Comparison Against Power Analysis Attacks
In this paper, we present a review of the work [1]. The fast settlement of Privacy and Secure operations in the Internet of Things (IoT) is appealing the selection of mechanisms to achieve a higher level of security at the minimum cost and with reasonable performances. In recent years, dozens of pro...
| Autores: | , , , , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | capítulo de libro |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Sevilla (US) |
| Repositorio: | idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:idus.us.es:11441/161172 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/11441/161172 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Hardware countermeasures Gate level VLSI design of cryptographic circuits Side-channel attacks (SCAs) Information security Logic design Internet of things (IoT) |
| Sumario: | In this paper, we present a review of the work [1]. The fast settlement of Privacy and Secure operations in the Internet of Things (IoT) is appealing the selection of mechanisms to achieve a higher level of security at the minimum cost and with reasonable performances. In recent years, dozens of proposals have been presented to design circuits resistant to Power Analysis attacks. In this paper a deep review of the state of the art of gate-level countermeasures against Power Analysis attacks has been done, performing a comparison between hiding approaches (the power consumption is intended to be the same for all the data processed) and the ones considering a masking procedure (the data are masked and behave as random). The most relevant proposals in the literature, 35 for hiding and 6 for masking, have been analyzed, not only by using data provided by proposers, but also those included in other references for comparison. |
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