Campaign contributions and local public goods in a federation
I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto efficient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated w...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article/360 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/360 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | local public goods efficiency externalities federalism elections and campaign contributions H41 H21 H23 H77 D72 bienes públicos locales eficiencia externalidades federalismo elecciones y contribuciones de campaña |
| Sumario: | I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto efficient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters. For the economy with campaign contributions, LPGs with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient, and the system of local governments maximizes the gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences. |
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