Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy
In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient lo...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | México |
| Recursos: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article/102 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/102 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | inter-governmental transfers size of government electoral competition H77 H41 H50 transferencias inter-gubernamentales tamaño del gobierno competencia electoral |
| Resumo: | In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers. ii) The central government has political incentives to produce differentiated and uniform local public goods. Moreover, we provide a comparative analysis to study the influence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional spillovers of local public goods, and the distribution of the population in the economy on the size and distribution of local public spending. |
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