VOTING IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS IN A FISCALLY CENTRALIZED ECONOMY
In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that, i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient lo...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez |
| Repositorio: | Redalyc-UACJ |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:59719742005 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59719742005 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Economía y Finanzas Inter size of government electoral competition governmental transfers |
| Sumario: | In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that, i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers. ii) The central government has political incentives to produce differentiated and uniform local public goods. Moreover, we provide a comparative analysis to study the influence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional spillovers of local public goods, and the distribution of the population in the economy on the size and distribution of local public spending. |
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