The electoral bias: the political economy of subnational transfers in Latin America
This article examines whether transfers to local governments in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile have been allocated to obtain electoral advantage. A large panel dataset and fixed effects estimations uncover two type of manipulations: grant fluctuations along the municipal election cycle and biase...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad del País Vasco |
| Repositorio: | Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/70349 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/70349 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | distributive politics intergovernmental transfers Electoral competition political budget cycles local governments Latin America |
| Sumario: | This article examines whether transfers to local governments in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile have been allocated to obtain electoral advantage. A large panel dataset and fixed effects estimations uncover two type of manipulations: grant fluctuations along the municipal election cycle and biases towards aligned municipalities. There are, notwithstanding, significant cross-country differences. In Brazil, Colombia and Chile mayors aligned with the central government coalition are systematically benefited, especially ahead elections, whereas in Mexico political budget cycles do not discriminate in terms of partisanship. These results point to institutional conditions and the nature of electoral competition shaping distributive politics. |
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