Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets
We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/104723 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/104723 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Mercat de treball Cooperatives Fallides bancàries Fallida Labor market Cooperative societies Bank failures Bankruptcy |
| Sumario: | We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyers- and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders' bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games. |
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