Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
We introduce non-manipulability by clones for bankruptcy problems, which entitles claimants to merge or split only when they are or become identical agents. We show that this weaker nonmanipulability requirement, together with either claim monotonicity or claims continuity, allows for new characteri...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Data de publicação: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/192705 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/192705 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Fallides bancàries Expectatives racionals (Teoria econòmica) Nombres racionals Desinformació Bank failures Rational expectations (Economic theory) Rational numbers Disinformation |
| Resumo: | We introduce non-manipulability by clones for bankruptcy problems, which entitles claimants to merge or split only when they are or become identical agents. We show that this weaker nonmanipulability requirement, together with either claim monotonicity or claims continuity, allows for new characterizations of the proportional rule on the general class of bankruptcy problems |
|---|