Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
We introduce non-manipulability by clones for bankruptcy problems, which entitles claimants to merge or split only when they are or become identical agents. We show that this weaker nonmanipulability requirement, together with either claim monotonicity or claims continuity, allows for new characteri...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/192705 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/192705 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Fallides bancàries Expectatives racionals (Teoria econòmica) Nombres racionals Desinformació Bank failures Rational expectations (Economic theory) Rational numbers Disinformation |
| Sumario: | We introduce non-manipulability by clones for bankruptcy problems, which entitles claimants to merge or split only when they are or become identical agents. We show that this weaker nonmanipulability requirement, together with either claim monotonicity or claims continuity, allows for new characterizations of the proportional rule on the general class of bankruptcy problems |
|---|