Aversion to norm-breaking: A model

In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We pr...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: López Pérez, Raúl
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2008
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/356661
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/356661
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Emotions
Fairness
Path-dependency
Reciprocity
Social norms
id ES_e0af642e02e5d19eb6dbed9f32d8d03e
oai_identifier_str oai:digital.csic.es:10261/356661
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Aversion to norm-breaking: A modelLópez Pérez, RaúlEmotionsFairnessPath-dependencyReciprocitySocial normsSocial normsIn experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocityPeer reviewedElsevierLópez Pérez, Raúl [0000-0002-8952-8914]202420242008info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/356661reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.009Noinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/3566612026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
title Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
spellingShingle Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
López Pérez, Raúl
Emotions
Fairness
Path-dependency
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social norms
title_short Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
title_full Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
title_fullStr Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
title_full_unstemmed Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
title_sort Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv López Pérez, Raúl
author López Pérez, Raúl
author_facet López Pérez, Raúl
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv López Pérez, Raúl [0000-0002-8952-8914]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Emotions
Fairness
Path-dependency
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social norms
topic Emotions
Fairness
Path-dependency
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social norms
description In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/356661
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/356661
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.009
No
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869422224799170560
score 15,812455

Similares en LA Referencia