Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We pr...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2008 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repository: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/356661 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/356661 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Emotions Fairness Path-dependency Reciprocity Social norms |
| Summary: | In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity |
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