La segunda persona en epistemología

This paper explores some recent proposals that apply second-person ideas to model some of our epistemic interactions. After criticizing those views that rely on the specific constitution of second-person reasons, either as reasons to trust or as reasons to accept or revise beliefs derived from mutua...

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Bibliographic Details
Author: Vega Encabo, Jesús
Format: article
Publication Date:2022
Country:España
Institution:Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Repository:Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM
Language:Spanish
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/709716
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10486/709716
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Razones de segunda persona
Deliberación
Testimonio
Confianza
Concepciones interpersonales del testimonio
Dependencia Epistémica
Perspectiva epistémica
Literatura
Description
Summary:This paper explores some recent proposals that apply second-person ideas to model some of our epistemic interactions. After criticizing those views that rely on the specific constitution of second-person reasons, either as reasons to trust or as reasons to accept or revise beliefs derived from mutual demands and relations of recognition, it is argued that it makes sense to incorporate some of the intuitions of the second-person model to characterise our testimonial and deliberative practices if one attends to how one learns to be an epistemic agent in contexts in which we share knowledge