La segunda persona en epistemología
This paper explores some recent proposals that apply second-person ideas to model some of our epistemic interactions. After criticizing those views that rely on the specific constitution of second-person reasons, either as reasons to trust or as reasons to accept or revise beliefs derived from mutua...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/709716 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/709716 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Razones de segunda persona Deliberación Testimonio Confianza Concepciones interpersonales del testimonio Dependencia Epistémica Perspectiva epistémica Literatura |
| Sumario: | This paper explores some recent proposals that apply second-person ideas to model some of our epistemic interactions. After criticizing those views that rely on the specific constitution of second-person reasons, either as reasons to trust or as reasons to accept or revise beliefs derived from mutual demands and relations of recognition, it is argued that it makes sense to incorporate some of the intuitions of the second-person model to characterise our testimonial and deliberative practices if one attends to how one learns to be an epistemic agent in contexts in which we share knowledge |
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