A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement
We provide the first characterization of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism in the Shapley–Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) that uses respecting-improvement. Specifically, we show that for strict preferences, the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying pair...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repositorio: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/376109 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/376109 https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85214310790 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Housing markets Market design Pair-efficiency Respecting improvement Strategy-proofness Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism |
| Sumario: | We provide the first characterization of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism in the Shapley–Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) that uses respecting-improvement. Specifically, we show that for strict preferences, the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying pair-efficiency, respecting-improvement, and strategy-proofness. |
|---|