Legal validity and other properties of legal norms
In Kelsen's very influential account, legal validity is the specific mode of existence of legal norms. For this reason, legal validity entails legal applicability and legal bindingness. The chapter intends to show that these notions should be distinguished. It starts with the notion of memb...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | capítulo de libro |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Digital de la UPF |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/72552 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72552 https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/9780191964718.003.0008 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Legal validity Existence of norms Lgal applicability Legal bindingness Legal system membership Robust normativity |
| Sumario: | In Kelsen's very influential account, legal validity is the specific mode of existence of legal norms. For this reason, legal validity entails legal applicability and legal bindingness. The chapter intends to show that these notions should be distinguished. It starts with the notion of membership to a legal system: which are the criteria to identify certain norms as belonging to a legal system? Several issues are relevant here, for instance, is the efficacy a necessary condition of membership of legal norms to legal systems? In which sense the authorization of another legal norm N2, also a member to the legal system LS, is a criterion of membership of a legal norm N1 to a legal system LS? And, is this authorization only a formal authorization or a material authorization too? Secondly, the notion of applicability is introduced: in legal practice there are applicable norms that are not members of a legal system, we can think on foreign legal norms, which are not part of the domestic legal system, but applicable in virtue of conflict of laws rules. Finally, the notion of bindingness of legal norms is presented. This notion refers to the question of justified normativity. In which conditions are legal norms apt to provide us reasons for action? Moreover, is legal normativity linked in some sense to robust normativity? |
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