Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decom...

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Autores: Alcalde Unzu, Jorge, Gallo, Oihane, Vorsatz, Marc
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universidad Pública de Navarra
Repositorio:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
OAI Identifier:oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/52302
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2454/52302
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Single-dipped preferences
Single-peaked preferences
Social choice rule
Strategy-proofness
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spelling Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferencesAlcalde Unzu, JorgeGallo, OihaneVorsatz, MarcSingle-dipped preferencesSingle-peaked preferencesSocial choice ruleStrategy-proofnessWe analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project PID2021-127119NB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by "ERDF A way of making Europe"); Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through project 100018_192583, and additional support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects PID2021-127119NB-I00 and PID2019-107539GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”).ElsevierEconomíaEkonomiaInstitute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE2024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2454/52302reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarrainstname:Universidad Pública de NavarraInglésinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2021-2023/PID2021-127119NB-I00info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-107539GB-I00© 2024 The Author(s). This is an open access article under the CC BY license.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/523022026-06-17T12:41:47Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
title Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
spellingShingle Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
Single-dipped preferences
Single-peaked preferences
Social choice rule
Strategy-proofness
title_short Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
title_full Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
title_fullStr Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
title_full_unstemmed Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
title_sort Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
Gallo, Oihane
Vorsatz, Marc
author Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
author_facet Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
Gallo, Oihane
Vorsatz, Marc
author_role author
author2 Gallo, Oihane
Vorsatz, Marc
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Economía
Ekonomia
Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Single-dipped preferences
Single-peaked preferences
Social choice rule
Strategy-proofness
topic Single-dipped preferences
Single-peaked preferences
Social choice rule
Strategy-proofness
description We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2454/52302
url https://hdl.handle.net/2454/52302
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2021-2023/PID2021-127119NB-I00
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-107539GB-I00
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © 2024 The Author(s). This is an open access article under the CC BY license.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © 2024 The Author(s). This is an open access article under the CC BY license.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname:Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname_str Universidad Pública de Navarra
reponame_str Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
collection Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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