All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the c...
| Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2023 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:288544 |
| Online Access: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288544 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3982/TE5111 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Obvious Strategy-proofness Sequential Allotment Rules Division Problems Single-peaked Preference |
| Summary: | For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting. |
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