Strategy-proof location of public facilities
Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility su...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/33493 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/33493 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Social choice rule Strategy-proofness Pareto efficiency Single-peaked preferences Single-dipped preferences |
| Sumario: | Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules. |
|---|