The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness

We develop a game-theoretical model of honesty and fairness to study cooperation in social dilemma games with communication. It is based on two key intuitions. First, players suffer a utility cost if they break norms of honesty and fairness, and this cost is highest if most others comply with the no...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: López Pérez, Raúl
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2012
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/375115
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375115
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Communication
Cooperation
Fairness
Heterogeneity
Honesty
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social interaction
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spelling The power of words: A model of honesty and fairnessLópez Pérez, RaúlCommunicationCooperationFairnessHeterogeneityHonestyReciprocitySocial normsSocial interactionWe develop a game-theoretical model of honesty and fairness to study cooperation in social dilemma games with communication. It is based on two key intuitions. First, players suffer a utility cost if they break norms of honesty and fairness, and this cost is highest if most others comply with the norm. Second, people are heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. We show that a model based on honesty norms alone cannot explain why pre-play communication fosters cooperation in simultaneous social dilemmas. In contrast, the model based on norms of honesty and fairness can. We also illustrate other predictions of the model, offering experimental evidence in line with them – e.g., the effect of communication on cooperation depends on how many players communicate, and whether the social dilemma is played simultaneously or sequentially. In addition, ideas for new experiments are suggested.I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the European Union through the ENABLE Marie Curie Research Training Network.Peer reviewedElsevierEuropean CommissionLópez Pérez, Raúl [0000-0002-8952-8914]202420242012info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/375115reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.004Noinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/3751152026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
title The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
spellingShingle The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
López Pérez, Raúl
Communication
Cooperation
Fairness
Heterogeneity
Honesty
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social interaction
title_short The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
title_full The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
title_fullStr The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
title_full_unstemmed The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
title_sort The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv López Pérez, Raúl
author López Pérez, Raúl
author_facet López Pérez, Raúl
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv European Commission
López Pérez, Raúl [0000-0002-8952-8914]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Communication
Cooperation
Fairness
Heterogeneity
Honesty
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social interaction
topic Communication
Cooperation
Fairness
Heterogeneity
Honesty
Reciprocity
Social norms
Social interaction
description We develop a game-theoretical model of honesty and fairness to study cooperation in social dilemma games with communication. It is based on two key intuitions. First, players suffer a utility cost if they break norms of honesty and fairness, and this cost is highest if most others comply with the norm. Second, people are heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. We show that a model based on honesty norms alone cannot explain why pre-play communication fosters cooperation in simultaneous social dilemmas. In contrast, the model based on norms of honesty and fairness can. We also illustrate other predictions of the model, offering experimental evidence in line with them – e.g., the effect of communication on cooperation depends on how many players communicate, and whether the social dilemma is played simultaneously or sequentially. In addition, ideas for new experiments are suggested.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375115
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375115
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.004
No
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.812455

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