Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes
This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a well-k...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2012 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Politècnica de València (UPV) |
| Repositorio: | RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:riunet.upv.es:10251/56504 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://riunet.upv.es/handle/10251/56504 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Allocations Cooperative games Linear production games Benefit functions Cooperative game Linear production Linear production game Optimal production Production plans Solution set Stability properties Game theory Optimization Planning Production control Project management Stability Production engineering ESTADISTICA E INVESTIGACION OPERATIVA |
| Sumario: | This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a well-known solution rule for the class of linear production processes. Despite their stability properties, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players that are necessary for optimal production plans. This paper shows that, in general, the aforementioned drawback cannot be avoided allowing only allocations within the core of the cooperative game associated to the original linear production process, and therefore a new solution set named EOwen is introduced. For any player whose resources are needed in at least one optimal production plan, the EOwen set contains at least one allocation that assigns a strictly positive payoff to such player. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
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