Stability and voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041, Neme, Alejandro, Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904, Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2004
País:España
Institución:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:142910
Acceso en línea:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142910
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Vot
Elecció social
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spelling Stability and voting by committees with exitMassó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041Neme, AlejandroBerga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213VotElecció socialWe study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society. 22004-01-0120042004-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501SMURhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/142910https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengMinisterio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 BEC2002-04102-C02-01Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 AGL2001-2333-C02-01Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 BEC2002-02130Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2001/SGR-00162open accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:1429102026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Stability and voting by committees with exit
title Stability and voting by committees with exit
spellingShingle Stability and voting by committees with exit
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Vot
Elecció social
title_short Stability and voting by committees with exit
title_full Stability and voting by committees with exit
title_fullStr Stability and voting by committees with exit
title_full_unstemmed Stability and voting by committees with exit
title_sort Stability and voting by committees with exit
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
author Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
author_facet Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
author_role author
author2 Neme, Alejandro
Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Vot
Elecció social
topic Vot
Elecció social
description We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2004-01-01
2004
2004-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
SMUR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142910
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142910
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 BEC2002-04102-C02-01
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 AGL2001-2333-C02-01
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 BEC2002-02130
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2001/SGR-00162
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
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