Voting by committees under constraints
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2005 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:142702 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142702 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Elecció social Vot Voting Strategy-proofness Additive and Separable Preferences |
| Sumario: | We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. |
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