Stability and voting by committees with exit
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new...
| Autores: | , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2004 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:142910 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142910 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Vot Elecció social |
| Sumario: | We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society. |
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