Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets

We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Feng, Di, Klaus, Bettina, Klijn, Flip
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/360471
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/360471
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85195018715
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Market design
Multiple-type housing markets
Non-bossiness
Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness
Strategy-proofness
Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism
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spelling Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing marketsFeng, DiKlaus, BettinaKlijn, FlipMarket designMultiple-type housing marketsNon-bossinessSelf-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofnessStrategy-proofnessTop-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanismWe consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top-trading-cycles (tTTC) mechanism. We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the tTTC mechanism. Second, we obtain a corresponding characterization for separable preferences. We obtain additional characterizations when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with self-enforcing group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness. Finally, we show that for strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Our characterizations of the tTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.Di Feng and Bettina Klaus gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through Project 100018_192583. Flip Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2021-SGR-00416) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033) through grant PID2020-114251GB-I00 and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).Peer reviewedElsevierSwiss National Science FoundationGeneralitat de CatalunyaAgencia Estatal de Investigación (España)Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)Klaus, Bettina [0000-0001-9140-4729]Klijn, Flip [0000-0001-7255-6954]Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]202420242024info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Publisher's versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/360471https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85195018715reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Inglés#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE##PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-114251GB-I00info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI//CEX2019-000915-SThe underlying dataset has been published as supplementary material of the article in the publisher platform at DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010Síinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/3604712026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
title Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
spellingShingle Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
Feng, Di
Market design
Multiple-type housing markets
Non-bossiness
Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness
Strategy-proofness
Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism
title_short Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
title_full Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
title_fullStr Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
title_full_unstemmed Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
title_sort Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Feng, Di
Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
author Feng, Di
author_facet Feng, Di
Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
author_role author
author2 Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Swiss National Science Foundation
Generalitat de Catalunya
Agencia Estatal de Investigación (España)
Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)
Klaus, Bettina [0000-0001-9140-4729]
Klijn, Flip [0000-0001-7255-6954]
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Market design
Multiple-type housing markets
Non-bossiness
Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness
Strategy-proofness
Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism
topic Market design
Multiple-type housing markets
Non-bossiness
Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness
Strategy-proofness
Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism
description We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top-trading-cycles (tTTC) mechanism. We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the tTTC mechanism. Second, we obtain a corresponding characterization for separable preferences. We obtain additional characterizations when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with self-enforcing group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness. Finally, we show that for strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Our characterizations of the tTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Publisher's version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/360471
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85195018715
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/360471
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85195018715
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv #PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-114251GB-I00
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI//CEX2019-000915-S
The underlying dataset has been published as supplementary material of the article in the publisher platform at DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010
Sí
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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