On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We ch...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:288667 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288667 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Strategy-proofness Unanimity Anonymity Tops-onlyness Single-peakedness |
| Sumario: | We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure. |
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