Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile

[EN]How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works invest...

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Autores: Gainza Barrencua, Xabier, Livert Aquino, Felipe Bernabé, Mogollón, Raymundo Jesús
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Institución:Universidad del País Vasco
Repositorio:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
OAI Identifier:oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/53756
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10810/53756
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:distributive politics
political budget cycle
democracy
Chile
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spelling Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from ChileGainza Barrencua, XabierLivert Aquino, Felipe BernabéMogollón, Raymundo Jesúsdistributive politicspolitical budget cycledemocracyChile[EN]How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.ANID Fast Track Competition, Project COVID-0419 (National Research and Development Agency, Chile).Elsevier202120212021info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/53756reponame:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigacióninstname:Universidad del País VascoIngléshttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379421000950?via%3Dihub#kwrds0010info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Atribución 3.0 Españaoai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/537562026-06-18T09:23:17Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
spellingShingle Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
Gainza Barrencua, Xabier
distributive politics
political budget cycle
democracy
Chile
title_short Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_full Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_fullStr Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_full_unstemmed Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_sort Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gainza Barrencua, Xabier
Livert Aquino, Felipe Bernabé
Mogollón, Raymundo Jesús
author Gainza Barrencua, Xabier
author_facet Gainza Barrencua, Xabier
Livert Aquino, Felipe Bernabé
Mogollón, Raymundo Jesús
author_role author
author2 Livert Aquino, Felipe Bernabé
Mogollón, Raymundo Jesús
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv distributive politics
political budget cycle
democracy
Chile
topic distributive politics
political budget cycle
democracy
Chile
description [EN]How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
2021
2021
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10810/53756
url http://hdl.handle.net/10810/53756
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379421000950?via%3Dihub#kwrds0010
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Atribución 3.0 España
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Atribución 3.0 España
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
instname:Universidad del País Vasco
instname_str Universidad del País Vasco
reponame_str Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
collection Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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