On the nature of inference in Boghossian
If believing based on reasons is something that apparently involves steps and takes time what prevents us from considering inferential judgment or reasoning in general as an activity, the product of a special kind of agency? The idea that there is genuine activity when we make an inference is impli...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/34644 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/34644 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Inference. Agency. Belief. Rational Causation. Boghossian. Inferencia. Agencia. Creencias. Causalidad racional. Boghossian Inferência Agência Crença Causação Racional Boghossian Natureza da inferência |
| Resumo: | If believing based on reasons is something that apparently involves steps and takes time what prevents us from considering inferential judgment or reasoning in general as an activity, the product of a special kind of agency? The idea that there is genuine activity when we make an inference is implicit in many authors. In this paper I analyze an explicit defense of this conception: the thesis developed by Paul Boghossian that inference is a form of cognitive action. I argue that there is a contrast in the structure of reasons and causation between believing for reasons and acting for reasons. And I conclude that what seems to be active in the specific case of reasoning which is to make an inference is due to its conceptual connection with the state of belief. When we believe that p based on q, we believe for a reason given to us by another belief. |
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