Irrational inference and rational belief Hume’s justification of induction
New arguments are presented for rejecting the idea that Hume was a sceptic about causal reasoning. I argue that Hume intended to show that causal inferences are rational, and that his attempt to do so was successful. In Part I an account of what it is to be a rational inference is proposed. Part II...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1997 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
| Repositorio: | Manuscrito (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8665451 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665451 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Hume Inferência irracional Crença racional |
| Sumario: | New arguments are presented for rejecting the idea that Hume was a sceptic about causal reasoning. I argue that Hume intended to show that causal inferences are rational, and that his attempt to do so was successful. In Part I an account of what it is to be a rational inference is proposed. Part II it is argued that Hume’s arguments that we are not determined by reason when we make causal inferences amount to an attack on a certain conception of how reasons cause beliefs for which they are supposed to be reasons, rather than na atack on the view that casual inferences envolve reasons. In Part III I show how Hume proposes to justify causal reasoning. Part IV I discuss the limitations of Hume’s justification, and why he sees his view as sceptical. In Part V, I discuss how Hume deals with the sceptical challeng to his justification, and argue that, although Hume does not meet the sceptic’s challenge, that does not prevent his arguments from being a justification of casual reasoning. |
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