Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
In this paper, I develop and defend an “identity premise” response to Paul Boghossian’s argument from inference. According to this argument, externalism about mental content is incompatible with a substantial notion of self-knowledge because it happens to be incompatible with the claim that we can k...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad del País Vasco |
| Repositorio: | Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/65607 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/65607 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Semantic Externalism Inference Epistemic Transparency Rationality Boghossian |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I develop and defend an “identity premise” response to Paul Boghossian’s argument from inference. According to this argument, externalism about mental content is incompatible with a substantial notion of self-knowledge because it happens to be incompatible with the claim that we can know a priori the logical properties of our thoughts. Here, I defend the identity premise response against four different criticisms, and to do so, I sketch the general lines for a picture on inference-engaging and rational explanation. |
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