Centralized allocation in multiple markets
We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly n...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/10743 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/10743 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Matching Group strategy-proofness Pareto efficiency Economia Administração de risco |
| Resumo: | We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case. Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditions under which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem with sibling priorities. |
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