Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups t...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2007 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Institución: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119338 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119338 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | BRIBE-PROOFNESS STRATEGY-PROOFNESS PARETO EFFICIENCY REPLACEMENT MONOTONICITY SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 |
| Sumario: | The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21] |
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