É hora de dissuadir a dissuasão? Um estudo dos efeitos da incorporação de um submarino convencional de propulsão nuclear
As the concepts of dissuasion and deterrence are key for the states’ strategies, and there is an intuitive link between those concepts and some specific weapons or equipments, this monograph aims to understand how the specific incorporation of a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), to the Brazilian pano...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) |
| Repositorio: | Conjuntura Austral |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:seer.ufrgs.br:article/124411 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/ConjunturaAustral/article/view/124411 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Dissuasion and deterrence. Seapower and naval power. Nuclear-Powered Submarines. Falklands. Grand Strategy. Dissuasão; Submarino de propulsão nuclear; Malvinas; Grande estratégia. |
| Sumario: | As the concepts of dissuasion and deterrence are key for the states’ strategies, and there is an intuitive link between those concepts and some specific weapons or equipments, this monograph aims to understand how the specific incorporation of a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), to the Brazilian panoply of military means, would contribute for the generation of deterrent effects. After studying the evolution of the related theory, this article examined how the deterrent dynamics have worked before and during the Falklands crisis and conflict. Therefore, this is based on a case study, with the main focus on extracting lessons learned from the british possession and employment, during real combat, of SSNs. The case study has confirmed the argument according to which the strategic deterrence based upon the operational deterrence given by a specific weapon demands the operational employment of that weapon to be part of a comprehensive national grand strategy. One that offers clear signals of the state’s resolve in employing that weapon, as a last resort. Otherwise, deterrence may not occur, given that operational deterrence does not automatically become a political-strategic deterrent. |
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