Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez
Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. Th...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
| Repositorio: | Mural Internacional (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br:article/75437 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/muralinternacional/article/view/75437 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Nonproliferation Nuclear-Powered Submarines Nuclear Safeguards Não Proliferação Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear Salvaguardas Nucleares |
| Resumo: | Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap. Received on: 30 Apr. 2023 | Accepted on: 18 Nov. 2023 |
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