To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) carries important considerations about how we justify our knowledge. In particular, the work introduces us to the so-called hinge propositions. Faced with the multiplicity of interpretations of this concept, we pervasively encounter the discussion about whet...

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Autor: Mota, Hugo Ribeiro
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)
Repositorio:Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/66403
Acceso en línea:https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Foundationalism
Sobre a Certeza
Fundacionismo
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spelling To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?Em que medida Wittgenstein seria fundacionista?WittgensteinOn CertaintyFoundationalismWittgensteinSobre a CertezaFundacionismoLudwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) carries important considerations about how we justify our knowledge. In particular, the work introduces us to the so-called hinge propositions. Faced with the multiplicity of interpretations of this concept, we pervasively encounter the discussion about whether they imply a foundationalism. If the ideas present in Wittgenstein's later works are commonly considered anti-foundationalist, then why would this not also be the case in On Certainty? On the one hand, authors such as Stroll (1994) understand that there is a type of foundationalist proposal. On the other hand, authors like Williams (2005) defend anti-foundationalism. From the analysis of both positions, we argue that an anti-foundationalist reading is more appropriate. Finally, enabled by anti-foundationalism, we present our antidogmatic reading whose objective is to emphasize that the work has the purpose of teaching us how to do philosophy without ignoring or disqualifying the diversity of existing cultures and perspectives.Sobre a Certeza (1969) de Ludwig Wittgenstein carrega considerações importantes sobre como justificamos nosso conhecimento. Em particular, a obra nos apresenta às assim chamadas hinge propositions. Diante da multiplicidade de interpretações desse conceito, encontramos de maneira pervasiva a discussão sobre se elas implicariam em um fundacionismo. Se as ideias presentes nos trabalhos da fase madura de Wittgenstein são comumente consideradas anti-fundacionistas, então por que esse não seria o caso também em Sobre a Certeza? Por um lado, autores como Stroll (1994) compreendem que há um tipo de proposta fundacionista. Por outro, autores como Williams (2005) defendem o anti-fundacionismo. A partir da análise de ambas as posições, argumentamos que uma leitura anti-fundacionista é mais adequada. Por fim, possibilitados pelo anti-fundacionismo, apresentamos nossa leitura antidogmática cujo objetivo é ressaltar que a obra tem como propósito nos ensinar a fazer filosofia sem ignorar ou desqualificar a diversidade de culturas e perspectivas existentes.Universidade Federal de Santa Maria2022-03-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdftext/htmlhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/6640310.5902/2179378666403Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 12 Nr. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 12 No 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 12 N. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2021): Estudos Schopenhauerianos + Dossiê O pensamento de Wittgenstein - Ed. 29; e022179-3786reponame:Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSMporhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403/46162https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403/46161Copyright (c) 2021 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMota, Hugo Ribeiro2024-12-20T13:50:53Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/66403Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/oaivoluntas@ufsm.br || centraldeperiodicos@ufsm.br2179-37862179-3786opendoar:2024-12-20T13:50:53Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
Em que medida Wittgenstein seria fundacionista?
title To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
spellingShingle To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
Mota, Hugo Ribeiro
Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Foundationalism
Wittgenstein
Sobre a Certeza
Fundacionismo
title_short To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
title_full To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
title_fullStr To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
title_full_unstemmed To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
title_sort To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Mota, Hugo Ribeiro
author Mota, Hugo Ribeiro
author_facet Mota, Hugo Ribeiro
author_role author
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Foundationalism
Wittgenstein
Sobre a Certeza
Fundacionismo
topic Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Foundationalism
Wittgenstein
Sobre a Certeza
Fundacionismo
description Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) carries important considerations about how we justify our knowledge. In particular, the work introduces us to the so-called hinge propositions. Faced with the multiplicity of interpretations of this concept, we pervasively encounter the discussion about whether they imply a foundationalism. If the ideas present in Wittgenstein's later works are commonly considered anti-foundationalist, then why would this not also be the case in On Certainty? On the one hand, authors such as Stroll (1994) understand that there is a type of foundationalist proposal. On the other hand, authors like Williams (2005) defend anti-foundationalism. From the analysis of both positions, we argue that an anti-foundationalist reading is more appropriate. Finally, enabled by anti-foundationalism, we present our antidogmatic reading whose objective is to emphasize that the work has the purpose of teaching us how to do philosophy without ignoring or disqualifying the diversity of existing cultures and perspectives.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-03-16
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403
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url https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403
identifier_str_mv 10.5902/2179378666403
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403/46162
https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403/46161
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 12 Nr. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02
Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02
Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02
Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 12 No 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02
Voluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 12 N. 2 (2021): Schopenhauerian Studies + Wittgenstein's Thought Dossier - Ed. 29; e02
Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2021): Estudos Schopenhauerianos + Dossiê O pensamento de Wittgenstein - Ed. 29; e02
2179-3786
reponame:Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)
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instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)
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reponame_str Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria)
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv voluntas@ufsm.br || centraldeperiodicos@ufsm.br
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