To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) carries important considerations about how we justify our knowledge. In particular, the work introduces us to the so-called hinge propositions. Faced with the multiplicity of interpretations of this concept, we pervasively encounter the discussion about whet...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
| Repositorio: | Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/66403 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/66403 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Wittgenstein On Certainty Foundationalism Sobre a Certeza Fundacionismo |
| Sumario: | Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) carries important considerations about how we justify our knowledge. In particular, the work introduces us to the so-called hinge propositions. Faced with the multiplicity of interpretations of this concept, we pervasively encounter the discussion about whether they imply a foundationalism. If the ideas present in Wittgenstein's later works are commonly considered anti-foundationalist, then why would this not also be the case in On Certainty? On the one hand, authors such as Stroll (1994) understand that there is a type of foundationalist proposal. On the other hand, authors like Williams (2005) defend anti-foundationalism. From the analysis of both positions, we argue that an anti-foundationalist reading is more appropriate. Finally, enabled by anti-foundationalism, we present our antidogmatic reading whose objective is to emphasize that the work has the purpose of teaching us how to do philosophy without ignoring or disqualifying the diversity of existing cultures and perspectives. |
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