Is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?
The idea that On Certainty reveals a third Wittgenstein has become common in the recent literature. In particular, Avrum Stroll argues that said work sets forth a new and powerful version of non-homogeneous foundationalism. The article examines that foundationalism and defends the argument that On C...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | Colombia |
| Institución: | Universidad del Rosario |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24242 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24242 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | A Stroll Foundationalism L Wittgenstein |
| Sumario: | The idea that On Certainty reveals a third Wittgenstein has become common in the recent literature. In particular, Avrum Stroll argues that said work sets forth a new and powerful version of non-homogeneous foundationalism. The article examines that foundationalism and defends the argument that On Certainty deploys the methodology used in the Philosophical Investigations in order to point out a new form of logical impossibility. The article also shows how Stroll defends a position associated with substantialist readings of the Tractatus, and recommends an austere reading of On Certainty. |
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