ON FREGEAN SENSE AND MENTAL CONTENT
Fregeans follow Frege (1892) in accepting informativeness and substitution failure as reliable criteria for the existence of senses as objects of thought. In this paper I show that if we accept this, we must also accept the existence of an infinite hierarchy of senses as objects of thought. This is...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
| Repositorio: | Redalyc-UNAM |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:340032599004 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340032599004 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía Reference Individuation Determination |
| Sumario: | Fregeans follow Frege (1892) in accepting informativeness and substitution failure as reliable criteria for the existence of senses as objects of thought. In this paper I show that if we accept this, we must also accept the existence of an infinite hierarchy of senses as objects of thought. This is a bad result since it turns Fregeanism into a doctrine according to which object-related thoughts either have an infinite number of objects as contents or none at all. This shows, against the Fregean, that senses cannot themselves be constituents of thought. |
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